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NOTE FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Comments on Report - "Special Project COPE PACE", BYE  
111896-78, 4 January 1979

1. Per your request, I asked [REDACTED] to provide NPIC comments on the subject report. I've just received them and they are provided at attachment 1. My comments on NPIC's input are expressed in paragraph three below.

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2. My comments, keyed to specific pages of the [REDACTED] cover memorandum and the attached reports, are as follows:

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Cover Memorandum

- page 1, para 2.b, first bullet: In discussions that [REDACTED] and I had with CINCPAC and USFK personnel during our visit to the Pacific in November 1978, nowhere was there an indication of a "business-as-usual attitude about COPE PACE. The J-2 USFK did state that "he" was opposed to using operational assets for exercise purposes in his area because it takes away from the limited capabilities [REDACTED] available to him and his warning problem. To minimize his concern, COPE PACE included for the most part operational I&W targets. The J-2 also feels

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they know how to task the system. His own analysts and the CINCPAC Collection Management staff don't agree with him on this point, however. The statement "business-as-usual" attitude is contradictory to the statement made on page 10, i.e., "Special Project COPE PACE was generally felt to be useful".

- page 1, para 2.b., second bullet: This oversimplified statement is not really supported by the facts, especially for PHOTINT. CINCPAC and USFK collection management staffs are satisfied with the Command-CCF links and the so-called few "screw ups" in COPE PACE, cannot in any way be interpreted that the "interface between the systems and national tasking are not always as responsive as it should have been", unless he is referring to SIGINT, and, if so it should be so clarified.
- page 2, para 3a: It seems to me that the travelers do not have a very good appreciation of the efforts underway in CINCPAC to better utilize all-source intelligence, e.g., the efforts underway in IPAC to develop a capability to, in near real time, use and integrate all-source data, strategic and tactical alike. To approach the problem on a single "INT" basis is contradictory to

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Working Paper

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Destroy or Control  
By                     

26 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

SUBJECT : Special Project COPE PACE (U)

REFERENCE :                      Memo and Attached Report,  
4 January 1979, Subject as Above,  
                     TS

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1.            I have reviewed the referenced report and the records which were maintained on our participation in Special Project COPE PACE (SPCP). I have also discussed this report with those at PEG who participated in the exercise.

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2.                                      report directs two criticisms towards PEG reporting during SPCP. First, and perhaps most serious, was NPIC's "unwillingness" to report specific locations of naval vessels                                     . Secondly, that field units were unable to understand or utilize our response of No Reportable Change (NRC) for certain targets in our special summary reports. Furthermore, there was a general lack of understanding of our baseline (normalcy statements contained in the target profiles) and the responsibility for developing and maintaining the normalcy statements.

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3.            PEG's participation in SPCP was similar to that of previous JCS-sponsored exercises. A written plan outlining the project and detailing procedures for exploitation and reporting of SPCP targets was developed by PEG prior to exercise. The EXSUBCOM guidance to PEG was not received until two days before the exercise began. Twenty-eight of the 42 targets selected for the exercise

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
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4. [ ] The statement that PEG was "unwilling" or reluctant to report the specific location of naval vessels [ ] was the result of several factors. This original requirement for [ ] which was submitted by CINCPACFLT was lengthy and quite detailed. Sub-

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
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5. [ ] The lack of understanding of National level reporting terminology is disturbing. The No Reportable Change (NRC) response to requirements was approved by ENSUBCOM as a portion of the WWIPR format and as such should have been disseminated to all Unified and Specified commands by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Since this type of reporting has been part of PEG's operational reporting for the past two years, I am concerned as to how

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SUBJECT: Special Project COME FACH (C)

people in the field have been using the intelligence in our two daily summary cables. The comment that a data [REDACTED] prior to SPCP is erroneous.

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6. [REDACTED] Our statistics on SPCP are essentially the same as those contained in the report. Minor differences were noted but they do not change the thrust of the report.

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8. [REDACTED] In conclusion, I believe we supported SPCP in an enthusiastic and forthright manner. The shortcoming noted with regard to the report on [REDACTED] was

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[REDACTED]

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unintentional on the part of PEG and more the result that the requestor did not use the proper terminology in specifying the requirement--i.e., for specific location of naval vessels the proper terminology is: "Identify naval vessels and give reporting positions." The concern and lack of understanding over NPIC normalcy statements and NRC reports is a matter which should be addressed by EXSUBCOM and DIA.

C.M.P.

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[REDACTED]

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